Authorization that fails closed
A valid certificate and a live session prove who is calling — they grant nothing. Permissions resolve through users, groups, roles, and business units into more than sixty discrete rights, each grantable as view, add, edit, delete, or execute. Security administration itself is decomposed, so separation of duties is something you configure, not something you hope for. Any error while evaluating a right denies it.
▸Per-user, per-group, and per-business-unit data limits
▸Interactive and batch identities are distinct login types
▸Live session monitoring with administrative termination
Evidence by default
Every login attempt — successful or not — is recorded with source IP, machine, OS user, and client application. Every configuration change is audited field by field, old value and new. Security events land in the service log and the Windows event log with the context an analyst actually needs: which certificate, which endpoint, which user, from where.
▸Session forensics queryable by user and date range
▸Field-level change trail with full actor attribution
▸Handshake rejections and token failures logged with source